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EDITORIAL NOTES
made by the lessee, and so it is probable that this rule imposes no
great hardship on him.
-J. W. S.
W-I-El BY A STATE, OF THE RIGHT TO REGuLTUTE RATE.-AS the
regulation of rates charged by public utilities is admittedly a
governmental function-a function generally regarded as an exer-
cise of the police power of the state--there is obviously a grave, if
not vital, objection to holding that a state by its legislature may
ever waive the right to exercise this fundamental, governmental
power. Thus, it is well-settled law that neither the state, nor a
municipal corporation to which the state has delegated its powers,
can by contract waive the right to exercise those police powers
which protect the health, safety, or morals of the public. 2 May a
state, then, waive its right to exercise the allied power to regulate
rates?
Upon this point the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has held that this power-a police power-is so fundamentally
governmental and that the right to exercise it at all times is so
vital to the essential interests of the public and so dependent upon
changing conditions that any attempt by the state legislature to
relinquish the right is ineffectual." Hence, according to this view,
any alleged contract, purporting to be authorized by the state
directly through its legislature or indirectly through a municipal-
ity to the effect that rates thus fixed by the state or municipality
are not to be changed for a stipulated time, is not a valid contract,
and, therefore, any subsequent regulation of the rate by the state
is not an impairment of the obligation of a contract in contraven-
tion of the federal Constitution.4 Upon principle it is submitted
that the above-mentioned 'iew of the West Virginia court is sound;
but unfortunately the United States Supreme Court seems to
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Union Dry Goods Co. 'v. Georgia Public
Service Corporation, 248 U. S. 372 (1919) City of Benwood et al. v. Public Service
Commission, 75 W. Va. 127, 83 S. E. 295 (1914). But see William Draper Lewis,
"Constitutional Questions Involved in the Commodity Clause of the Hepburn Act,
21 HAly. L. REv. 595, 609.
2Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877); -Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S,
814 (1879) City of Petersburg v. Petersburg Aqueduct Co., 102 Va. 654, 47 S. E,
848 (1904); see FREUND, PoIsCE PowER, §§ 24, 362.
3Laurel Fork & Sand Hill R. R. Co. v. West Virginia Transportation Co., 25 W. Va,
324 (1884).
'Article I, § 10.
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have committed itself to a different doctrine;5 and the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, in purporting to follow the Su-
preme Court of the United States, has, in a very recent case,8
carried the federal doctrine so far as to warrant a consideration of
the soundness of the decision.
But, before considering the special facts of the principal case
as affecting the correctness either of its conclusion or of its reason-
ing, it will be necessary to ascertain the view of the United States
Supreme Court on this question. Perhaps the view of that court
can best be stated in the language of the court itself (per Mr.
Justice Moody) :7
"It has been settled by this court that the State may au-
thorize one of its municipal corporations to establish by an in-
violable contract the rates to be charged by a public service
corporation (or natural person) for a definite time and that
the effect of such a contract is to suspend, during the life of
the contract, the governmental power of fixing and regulating
the rates. . . But for the very reason that such a contract
has the effect of extinguishing pro tanto an undoubted power
of government. . . the authority to make it must clearly and
unmistakably appear and all doubts must be resolved in favor
of the continuance of the power."
"The general powers of a municipality or of any other
political subdivision of the State are not sufficient. Specific
authority for that purpose is required."
The United States Supreme Court, therefore, is invariably in-
clined to construe very strictly any alleged surrender by a state
of its right to regulate rates, and where there are two possible
constructions of the surrendering grant that construction is
adopted which retains the power in the state for the benefit of the
public.9 The basic question, then, is whether the surrendering
grants involved in the principal case confer "clearly and unmis-
takably" "specific authority" to contract away the right to regu-
late rates. The court held in the principal case that the state had
5See, e. g., Detroit v. Detroit Citizens Street Railway Co., 184 U. S. 368 (1902);
Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265 (1908),
and authorities therein cited. See, also, Pingree v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 118 Mich.
314, 76 N. W. 635 (1898). See a collection of authorities on the point in L. R. A.
1915C, 261 (note).
Wvirginia-Western Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 S. E. 723 (Va. 1919).
7Home Telephone A Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, note 5, p. 273.
sItalics ours.
9See, e. g., Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra,
note 5.
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granted to the municipality the power to make such a contract and
that, therefore, the subsequent regulation of the rate fixed by such
municipal contract impaired the obligation of a contract in vio-
lation of the federal Constitution. The statutory (and constitu-
tional) provisions relied upon by the court as granting to the
municipality the power to make such inviolable contract were as
follows :10
"No . . . [public utiltiy of the class in question] shall be
permitted to use the streets, alleys or public grounds of a
city or town without the previous assent of the corporate
authorities of such city or town."
"Every . . . grant [by a municipality of a franchise for
a term of years] shall . . . make adequate provision by way
of forfeiture of the grant, or otherwise, to secure efficiency
of public service at reasonable rates, and the maintenance of
the property in good order throughout the term of the grant."
"Nothing in this section shall impair the right which has
heretofore been or may hereafter be conferred by law upon
the authorities of any city, town or county to prescribe rules,
regulations or rates of charge to be observed by any public
service corporation in connection with any service performed
by it under a municipal or county franchise . .. .
"The . . . courts . . . shall have jurisdiction by manda-
mus . . . to enforce compliance by said cities or towns and
by all grantees of franchises . . . with all the terms and con-
tracts and obligations of either party, as contained in
franchises. "
These provisions undoubtedly confer upon: the municipality
very extensive powers to contract and to fix rates, but, assuming
that a state may, by express grant to that effect, confer upon a
municipality power to contract away the right to regulate rates,
it is submitted that the powers conferred by the above-mentioned
provisions are mere "general powers" to prescribe and fix rates
and are not "specific authority" to contract away the right to reg-
ulate rates; and the United States Supreme Court has held that
the grant by a state to a municipal corporation of the power "to
fix and determine" rates is a mere "general power" and not
"specific authority" to contract away this sovereign right.1 "It
"Other provisions, but little relied upon, together with the full form of the pro-
visions quoted from and the references thereto, are set forth in the statement of
facts by the judge in the principal case.
2"Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, note J5.
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authorizes the exercise of the governmental power" to regulate
rates but it does not "authorize a contract upon this important
and vital subject."' 2  To the same effect the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia has rather recently held that the power
of a municipal corporation to "contract and be contracted with"
and "to erect, or authorize or prohibit the erection of ....
water works" confers power to regulate water rates and to contract
with water works company as to the rates to be charged, but does
not confer power to contract away the state's right to intervene
and regulate the rates so fixed.13 Said the court :14
"For a municipal corporation to claim the power to fix
rates inviolably, it must show clear and express delegation of
the same to it from the legislature ..... .The presumption
is against such delegation of the power. The delegation must
clearly and unmistakably appear."
Does, then, such delegation of power "clearly and unmistakably
appear" from the provisions in the principal case? With great
deference it is submitted that, to use again the language of the
West Virginia court, there is no "clear and express delegation"
of the "power to fix rates inviolably," and as all doubts as to
the surrender by a state of its sovereign powers must be resolved
in favor of the state or, in other words, in favor of the public, it
would seem to follow that the court should have adopted that
construction which would not have involved a surrender by the
state of this important governmental power, a power which, be-
cause of ever-changing conditions, the state should always be free
to exercise in behalf of the public.
Upon this theory there was no valid contract in the principal
case that there would be no subsequent regulation of the rates
fixed by the municipality, and, therefore, there could be, of course,
no impairment of the obligation of a contract. However, suppose
that, but for the exercise by the state of its right or alleged right
to regulate rates, there is an otherwise valid contract that the
rates, as fixed by the municipality, are not to be changed, does
a subsequent change of rates by the state impair the obligation of
the contract within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition
that no state shall pass any "law impairing the obligation of
12Ibid., p. 274.
"
2City of Benwood et at. v. Public Service Commission, supra, note 1.
"Ibid., pp. 131, 132.
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contracts?" The United States Supreme Court has held that
such a contract, if made under an express delegation of authority
to that effect, is a contract within the protection of the "contract
clause" of the Constitution.1 5 But in a much later decision-a
case decided in January of this year 6 -the United States Su-
preme Court held that, where a public utility, acting under a
power granted by the state, had made a contract with a consumer
to furnish service at a stipulated rate, a subsequent regulation of
the rate by the state is not an impairment of the obligation of the
contract within the meaning of the Constitution, but is a legitimate
effect of a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Said the
court, quoting with approval from its former decisions:
"It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of
statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent
the state from properly exercising such powers as are vested
in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary
for the general good of the public, though contracts pre-
viously entered into between individuals may thereby be
affected. '17
"It is settled that neither the 'contract clause' nor the 'due
process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the
state to establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary
to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort or general
welfare of the community; that this power can neither be
abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by ex-
press grant, and that all contract and property rights are held
subject to its fair exercise.""'
"Contracts must be understood as made in reference to
the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the govern-
ment and no obligation of a contract can extend to defeat the
legitimate government authority."' 19
It is quite true that the facts in the later ease are somewhat
different from those in the first-mentioned cases, but the power
of the public service corporation in the later case to contract as
to rates depends, of course, on the grant by the state of the power
to make such contract, just as the power of the municipal cor-
poration in the earlier cases to contract as to rates depends on
5See authorities referred to, ,upra, note 5.
1
"Union Dry Goods Co. '. Georgia Public Service Corporation, supra, note 1.
'
1 Ibid., p. 375, quoting from Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 480 (1905).
'-
5 bas, p. 376, quoting from Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.
S. 548, 558 (1914). Italics ours.191bid., p. 376, quoting from Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, 551 (1870).
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the grant by the state of the power to make such contract; and if
"this power can neither be abdicated [by the state] nor bargained
away, and is inalienable even by express grant" in the later case
it would seem to be so, by the very same reasoning, in the former
class of cases. In other words, the reasoning of the court in the
later case would seem to indicate a possible change of view by the
Supreme Court in regard to the power of a state through its legis-
lature to waive the right to regulate rates. Whether the Supreme
Court is willing to apply the reasoning in the later case to facts
like those in the principal case remains to be seen, and the court
may hesitate to do so for the reason that it would require the
overruling of several former decisions, but it is submitted that
the reasoning of the court in the later decision is indisputably the
sounder in that it does not permit a state legislature to bargain
away its police power to the detriment of the public. Besides, it
would seem that in order to be consistent it would be necessary to
hold that a state, by its legislature, may not waive the right to
regulate rates, for, as we have seen, the Supreme Court holds that
a state, by its legislature, may not waive the right to exercise
those police powers which protect the public health, public safety
or public morals, though the same court has held that the state
may so waive the right to exercise the police power to regulate
rates, at least in some cases, and this though the same court has
held, in regard to regulating the service of public utilities, that
"the power of a state by appropriate legislation to provide for
the public convenience stands upon the same ground precisely as
its power by appropriate legislation to protect the public health,
the public morals or the public safety."' Now, if a state cannot
contract away the police power "to protect the public health, the
public morals or the public safety" and "the power of the state
by appropriate legislation to provide for the public convenience
stands upon the same footing precisely" how can it be consistently
held that a state can (at least in some cases) contract away the
power to regulate rates, a power which the court holds is a police
power and is clearly a "power to provide for the public
convenience?." Some commentators have attempted to explain this
apparent inconsistency by saying that the power to regulate rates
is not a police power but the power to control employments af-
fected with a public interest.2 t The United States Supreme Court,
'Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 300 (1899).
=Cf. 21 HARV. L. REV. 595, 609. See 23 HAnV. L. Rv. 388, A89.
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [1919], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol26/iss1/9
EDITOIAL NOTES
however, decided in the leading case on the question,2 2 and has
since frequently held,2 3 that the regulation of rates is an exercise
of the police power, and there seems to be no real ground for
doubting that decision.
Moreover, as we have seen, the Supreme Court has recently held
that a regulation by a public service commission changing the
rates fixed by contract between a consumer and a puhlic service
corporation does not impair the obligation of a contract within
the meaning of the Constitution for the reason, assigned by the
court, that the power to regulate rates is a police power and that
"it is settled that neither the 'contract clause' nor the 'due pro-
cess' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the state to
establish all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community; that this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained
away, and is inalienable even by express grant, and that all con-
tract and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise."
Now, if, as the court reasons in this case, a state cannot grant to
a public service corporation the power to contract away this right
to regulate rates, it is submitted that for the very same reasons a
state cannot grant to a municipal corporation the power to con-
tract away the right to regulate rates. It would seem, therefore,
that not only consistency but analogous precedent and sound prin-
ciple would lead to the conclusion that a state should never, even
by express legislative grant, be permitted to waive its sovereign
right to regulate rates, a conclusion, which because of ever-chang-
ing conditions and of the vital importance to the public of the
retention of the right, is, it would seem, "a consummation de-
voutly to be wished."
-T. P. H.
Is INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF INTOXICANTS BY PRIVATE
MEANS AND FOR PhERSONAL USE WITMN THE REED AmENDAENT?-
In a recent Virginia case,' the defendant had been indicted for
bringing intoxicating liquor into the state in violation of the fed-
eral "bone-dry law," usually lumovn as the Reed Amendment,
=Mrunn v. Illinois, supra, note 1.
=See, e. g., Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corporation, supra,
ncte 1.
ISickel v. Commonwealth, 99 S. E. 678 (1919).
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